Regional Architecture for Financial Cooperation in East Asia

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This article discusses various modes of financial cooperation in East Asia that might come about in the future based on on-going initiatives and possible new initiatives. It is taken from part of a report prepared by the authors for a project on “Toward a Regional Financial Architecture for East Asia” that was coordinated by the ASEAN Secretariat. Various modes of financial cooperation discussed are 1) information exchanges and surveillance processes; 2) Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI); 3) fostering bond markets in Asia; 4) exchange rates and reserves management coordination; and 5) toward greater relative stability of regional currencies.

1. Information Exchanges and Surveillance Processes

The Manila Framework Group was established in November 1997 for the overriding purpose of regional surveillance. This Group meets semiannually and brings together representatives of 14 countries, both within and outside the Asia and Pacific region. In these meetings, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank provide surveillance reports. In October 1998, the ASEAN Finance Ministers established the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). The overall purpose is to strengthen the capacity of policy making within the ASEAN group. In addition to the steady monitoring of exchange rates and macroeconomic aggregates, the ASP examines sectoral and social policies, and includes provisions for capacity building, institutional strengthening, and sharing of information. This process was enlarged to cover ASEAN+3 in November 1999, and the first peer review meeting under the ASEAN+3 Surveillance Process was held in May 2000. In May 2001 the ASEAN+3 early warning systems were formulated to help detect emerging macroeconomic, financial, and corporate sector vulnerabilities, in the attempt to prevent financial crises in the future.

Manupipatpong (2002) gives details on the development and process of the ASP as well as an evaluation of its potential contributions and limitations. He suggested that the ASP can provide value added to the regular IMF surveillance by having more input from regional experts who are more familiar with the realities and constraints facing economies in the region, while IMF recommendations tended to be based on first-best theoretical considerations that may not be practical given the socio-political characteristics of the region. The regional peer review process could therefore be an additional forum to highlight possible vulnerabilities from the perspectives of people who are more familiar with the realities facing various economies in the region.

While the regional surveillance process can provide useful information exchanges and mutual discussions of economic problems or challenges facing the region, one should not over-estimate the ability of the regional peer review process to warn of an impending crisis and to get the vulnerable countries to take appropriate corrective actions. For example, if such a peer review process had existed prior to the crisis, would it have made a real difference in preventing the 1997 crisis? This is somewhat doubtful. In hindsight, we now know the importance of avoiding a huge buildup of short-term foreign debt. However, before the crisis, not much attention was paid to short-term foreign debt, and in many countries, data on short-term foreign debt were not readily available. Countries may have even regarded the ability to attract foreign borrowing as a sign of confidence by foreign lenders in the strength of the economy, and the accompanying increase in official reserves as a result of the large inflow of foreign borrowing was also regarded as another sign of increased stability. Thus, prior to the crisis, most of the focus was on how strong the economies in East Asia were. This was the case for those in the region as well as

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from outside the region, such as multilateral agencies and credit rating agencies. Even though Jim Walker and others may have flagged warnings, these warnings were overwhelmed by other indicators that were regarded as signs of strengths. Krugman (1994) may have pointed out that the successes of the East Asian economies were due more to perspiration rather than inspiration, but relying on perspiration is a far cry from being close to a crisis.

The point is that if there is some consensus as to what types of indicators point to major risks and vulnerabilities for an economy to get into a crisis, then a regional peer review process can be effective in helping each other find ways to deal with potential problems. However, a crisis normally arises from previously unexpected reasons. After a crisis, and after analyses of why it occurred, the reasons tend to become clearer and a consensus develops. At the time when there is little consensus on what might bring about a crisis, the effectiveness of a regional surveillance process is much more doubtful. Vulnerable countries would tend to deny that certain factors pointed out by some of the others as being signs of vulnerability to a crisis are in fact so. Political considerations at home would also tend to encourage this, as all governments want to give an impression of effective performance to its people and would normally stress indicators of good performance and downplay indicators of vulnerabilities, or to suggest that potential problem areas are well under control.

Given political constraints in official surveillance mechanisms, a parallel informal surveillance mechanism should be set up making use of non-government think tanks, autonomous institutions and independent scholars. Such institutions and individuals who are more independent of governments can provide perspectives independent of the official line. There are already a number of research networks in the region. For example, as part of the Global Development Network (GDN) there is the East Asian Development Network (EADN) comprising 32 research organizations in 10 countries of East Asia ranging from South Korea to Indonesia. There is also the GDN-Japan, currently coordinated by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). It would be possible to develop joint surveillance activities between GDN-Japan and the EADN making use of the various research organizations of these networks. This could be initiated almost immediately by the ASEAN Secretariat in cooperation with JBIC and the EADN hub. As this parallel surveillance becomes more established, there could be some activities involving other regional networks of GDN as well, for example it might be very useful to have joint meetings between the networks in East Asia and the regional network in Latin America and the Caribbean (LACEA) given the crisis experiences in both regions. The joint meeting could possibly be organized once every two or three years. Getting think tanks and various other non-government institutions and individuals involved in contributing to an informal surveillance process in this way should provide the diversity of views that can effectively complement the official surveillance process.

2. Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI)

At their May 2001 meeting held in Chiang Mai, the ASEAN Finance Ministers came up with CMI which calls for expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) and network of Bilateral Swaps and Repurchase Agreements (BSA). The ASA, earlier established by five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to provide liquidity support for the participating countries that experience balance-of-payments difficulties, was expanded to cover all ASEAN members and the total amount was also increased from US$ 200 million to US$ 1 billion. The swap transactions have a maturity not exceeding six months, subject to rollover for a period not exceeding six months. The contributions from participating countries are based on the ability to pay.

The BSA is a facility in the form of swaps of U.S. dollars with the domestic currencies of participating countries. Repurchase agreements were planned to provide liquidity support through the sale and buyback of U.S. Treasury notes or bills with a remaining life of not more than five years and government securities of the counter-party country. By October 2003, 13 BSAs have been successfully concluded with a combined total size of roughly US$ 35 billion. Under the terms of these bilateral swap arrangements, 10 percent of the agreed amount could be utilized without any linkage to IMF assistance for 180 days. For the rest, a condition is that the country is already under the IMF assistance program or will be in the near future. The linkage to the IMF program is meant to ensure that the major part of these swap arrangements is not independent of IMF assistance, and to ease the fears of those who are concerned with potential conflicts with IMF conditionality and moral hazard problems.

While the total of all the various swap arrangements comes to about US$ 35 billion, the amount available to each country is in fact not that large, especially if one thinks of the ability of countries to draw on these swap agreement without having to enter into an IMF supported program. For example, if these expanded ASA and BSA were already in place prior to the crisis in 1997, prior to asking for IMF assistance, Thailand would have been able to draw US$ 300 million from the ASA plus another US$ 600 million from 10 percent of the BSA allowable without any attachment to an IMF program. This amount is insignificant compared to the scale of problem that Thailand was in by about mid-1997. Therefore, the amount of money available currently under CMI is much too small to make a lot of difference.
To turn CMI into something more meaningful, at least two things will be necessary. First, the amount of money needs to increase substantially, and second, an organization to coordinate the funding mechanisms of the expanded CMI needs to be set up. This takes us back to the initial idea to set up a regional monetary organization for East Asia, the so-called Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposed by Japan during the early stages of the financial crisis. This idea was shot down at the time, partly because the necessary groundwork to develop a consensus on the idea was not carried out sufficiently in the region. It is recommended that serious thought be now given to the setting up of such an organization.

There is nothing new in setting up a regional monetary organization. So arguments that a regional monetary organization will necessarily bring about all sorts of problems, such as moral hazards etc., should not be taken too seriously. In fact, there is already an AMF in the form of the Arab Monetary Fund. The AMF was set up by the Economic Council of the League of Arab States in 1976, with the aim of assisting member countries in eliminating payments and trade restrictions, in achieving exchange rate stability, in developing capital markets, and in correcting payments imbalances through the extension of short- and medium-term loans. It also sought the coordination of the monetary policies of member countries and the liberalization and promotion of trade and payments, as well as the encouragement of capital flows among member countries. Another regional monetary organization is the Latin American Reserve Fund (LARF) which was established in 1991 as the successor to the Andean Reserve Fund (ARF). LARF’s aims are to assist in correcting payments imbalances through loans with terms of up to four years and guarantees extended to members; to coordinate their monetary, exchange, and financial policies and to promote the liberalization of trade and payments in the Andean sub-region. Thus, a new regional monetary organization for East Asia would not be a new species of regional arrangements, but simply a new East Asian incarnation of an existing species.

Establishing such an organization would also facilitate the coordination of a lot of necessary work to support many areas of financial cooperation that need to be promoted in the region in future. Currently, there is no clear focal point in the region for work on these issues, whether on surveillance, on crisis prevention and resolution, on harmonization of codes and regulatory standards, on exchange rate and monetary coordination etc. This organization would be involved in coordinating the expansion of the CMI process, possibly to transform it into a multilateral mechanism, rather than a network of bilaterals as at present. It should also be the focal point for a lot of work on technical issues that will be necessary to support further financial cooperation initiatives in the region.

At this stage, political commitment to set up such an organization should be sought from the ASEAN+3 leaders, with broad outlines of the rationale and scope of work of such an organization. The role of such an organization should be broad, and not simply limited to the management of liquidity support for crisis-hit countries and crisis resolution. Its scope of work should also cover the broad range of work needed to support further monetary cooperation in East Asia, including work that are related to laying the groundwork for eventual monetary integration, if such an integration should happen sometime in the far future.

As far as relations with the IMF is concerned, the way that the organization can work in complementary fashion to the IMF can also be laid out. At the beginning, this should involve a very close link to the IMF (concerning liquidity support and conditionality) in a similar way that the current CMI is closely tied to the IMF. This is because the new organization needs time to establish its technical expertise and develop reputation to generate the confidence of the financial market. Over time, the scope of the links to the IMF can be reduced, though there should still be some links maintained. Exactly how much links and in what way remain to be worked out.

It may take a few years before such an organization can be formally started. In the meantime, the ASEAN Secretariat together with some organizations from the Plus 3 countries could begin some of the necessary technical and coordination work that will eventually be transferred to the new organization once it is established. Finally, a name different to the Asian Monetary Fund should be chosen. This will make clear the much broader scope of work of the new organization compared to the more specific focus of the IMF, and also lead to less controversy about the setting up of such an organization.

3. Fostering Bond Markets in Asia

The underdevelopment of Asia’s capital markets was one very important factor behind the crisis. The three countries that became insolvent and had to resort to IMF assistances (Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea) all had relied too much on short-term foreign borrowing. Their short-term debt was larger than the size of their official reserves at the start of 1997, and they were the only three countries in the region where this was the case. Therefore, a major lesson that needs to be learned from the currency crisis is that an effective regional long-term capital market needs to be developed so that countries and particularly companies can have easy access to long-term investment financing. They will therefore need to rely much less on short-term borrowing in the future.

An important concrete initiative in this direction is the development of the Asian Bond market. On 2 June
2003 the central banks of 11 Asian economies (Australia, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) announced the launch of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF). Approximately US$ 1 billion will be gathered from these central banks and invested in a basket of liquid U.S. dollar bonds of major Asian economies (excluding Australia, Japan, and New Zealand). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which has managed fixed income portfolios for central banks for many years, is given the ABF mandate. The BIS stated that “the ABF is a significant step in fostering regional cooperation in Asia. It will facilitate the re-investment of a small portion of Asia’s reserves back into the region while at the same time aiding the development of regional capital markets.” Roughly speaking, the scheme is promising, as Asian countries, which altogether command a colossal share of global foreign exchange reserves, will in effect recycle their own buffer stock funds to provide long-term financing to directly assist their intra-regional partner countries as the need arises.

Since the beginning of 2004, ASEAN+3 started promoting sovereign governments of Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea to issue new local-currency bonds. Along this supply side of the Asian Bond development, foreign units/entities are encouraged to participate liberally as investors so that the development of bond markets in Asia may be quickened. The Asian Cooperative Dialogue (ACD), initiated by Thailand, has agreed to launch the second round of ABF. In this round, private investors are allowed, and so are other countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Bonds will be issued in Asian local currencies in order to accelerate the development of bond markets in Asia.

Thailand has volunteered to be the center for the establishment of an Asia Bond Institute (ABI). The institute would act as a secretariat organization in gathering information and monitoring the progress of the Asia bond market’s development. This would be reported to the meeting of Asian finance ministers. The work of the institute should speed up the development of the regional bond market, as there are many technical issues to be dealt with, whether related to the bond issuer, investor, and the development of the appropriate regional infrastructure for the bond market. The establishment of such an ABI should be supported.

While the development of an efficient and effective bond market in the region is very important, it is necessary to think carefully about what should be expected of such a market and where there may be risks that the market can actually contribute to instabilities rather promote stability in the region.

There are two types of mismatches that are related to the financial crisis. First is the maturity mismatch, where the reliance on short-term loans leads to an explosion in short-term debt of the country, and when there are not enough foreign currencies left in the country to back up these debt then the country essentially becomes insolvent. The ability of countries and companies to raise long-term loans in the bond market by issuing dollar bonds (or denominated in some other fully convertible international currency) can remedy this type of mismatch. The first phase of the Asian Bond initiative, where the focus was on US$ bond is part of what will be needed to deal with the maturity mismatch issue.

The second type of mismatch is currency mismatch, where firms borrow in foreign currencies while they may earn mainly local currencies (such as for example real estate companies). For this, there is now the idea that the bond to be promoted should also be local currency bonds. If this is simply concerned with making it easier for local companies to raise long-term borrowing through the domestic bond market by issuing local currency bond, then this will clearly be very useful. Prior to the crisis, the local bond markets of many East Asian countries were not very active and these markets were not effective sources of long-term financing for companies that need to raise investment funds. However, the situation is now very different in many countries. The reason for inactive local bond markets prior to the crisis was that many of the East Asian governments were running budget surpluses prior to the crisis (Thailand had 9 years of consecutive budget surpluses prior to the crisis). There was therefore not enough supply of government bonds to provide yield curve benchmarks and liquidity for the bond market. However, as a result of the crisis, governments of crisis affected countries have had to run sizeable budget deficits in order to use fiscal expenditures to stimulate their economies and clean up the financial and real sectors. In many countries there are now very active local bond markets, with well established yield curves (from short-term maturity to almost 20 years maturity in Thailand). The bond market has also become popular for investors as interest rates on deposits in financial institutions are currently very low due to the excess liquidity still existing in the banking system. Well established companies can now easily raise money in the bond market, and at rates that are cheaper than borrowing from banks.

A more problematical suggestion is to develop regional markets for local currency bonds of various countries; for example, a Thai company issuing Baht bond that is then traded in the regional bond market. This suggestion needs to be thought through more carefully. Having local currency bonds traded actively in the regional bond market can be very risky. It is like having an active off-shore markets for local currencies (as local currency bonds are settled in local currencies). This is a potentially dangerous source of currency instabilities, and most central banks in the region would be opposed to such a development. Even Singapore, with a highly evolved financial market, still maintains control on dealings with off-shore accounts in order to limit the extent of the off-shore Singapore dollar market.
Prior to the crisis, Thailand allowed the off-shore Baht market to become too active, and this was the ammunition that speculators used to attack the Baht and eventually led to the crisis. Thus, after the crisis, Thailand reverted to a tighter control on dealings between financial institutions and non-resident Baht accounts in order to control the size and activity of the off-shore Baht market. In the case of Malaysia, the off-shore Ringitt market was closed down completely to prevent currency speculation and made sure that Malaysia need not seek IMF assistance. It is still closed to this day, so Ringitts outside of Malaysia cannot be traded. In this case, it does not make much sense to have Ringitt denominated bonds being traded in the regional (i.e., off-shore) bond market.

This issue needs to be carefully thought through as there seems to be a number of suggestions floating around to develop these local currency regional bond markets. It is unlikely that most countries will be ready for this, especially if these bond markets are going to be sizeable in scope and also fairly liquid. It does not make much sense for them to still be very concerned about off-shore markets for their local currencies, while actively promoting off-shore markets for local currency bonds, as the two are basically equivalent. If such a market is to be developed, then it will have to be done in conjunction with the move to make regional currencies more internationalized. This will have to be done step by step and ensure proper sequencing to prevent financial instabilities in the region.

What can be done is to make it more easier for off-shore investors to have access to local currency bonds that are traded in the domestic bond markets. That is, trading and settlement are done in the domestic market, but foreign investors have easy access to invest in these bonds. This actually already happens. For example, Japanese savers (even individuals) can invest in Baht bond traded in Bangkok through Japanese financial institutions that have local branches in Bangkok. There seems to be some demand for this type of investment as interest rates in Japan are almost zero, even though the investor will have to take the currency risk associated with changes in the exchange rate between the Baht and the Yen. Rules, regulations and tax regimes should facilitate the promotion of this type of investment. Of course, with liberalized capital flows to invest in the capital market, a flexible exchange rate regime is most appropriate in order to maintain some independence for monetary policy.

As demand builds for investment in local currency bonds (though still traded and settled locally), companies can develop innovative new products. For example, a fixed income fund may be offered to investors backed up by local currency bonds of a number of countries in order to minimize the currency risks. One can even imagine the develop of an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) indexed bond, which is simply a derivative product backed up by a basket of local currency bonds. This would be something fully market driven to balance between currency risks and the relative returns of local currency bonds.

4. Exchange Rates and Reserves Management Coordination

With the current large imbalances in the world financial system, there is a need for East Asian countries to seriously discuss exchange rates issues and hence reserves management issues. Will the region continue to accumulate reserves in an unlimited fashion in order to keep our currencies closely tied to the US$, or at least does not strengthen too much with respect to the US$,
and thereby continue to support the very large US budget and current account deficits?

The advantage of this strategy is that the US market is an important absorber of the products produced in East Asia, and therefore the US market is still an important engine for growth of the region. The fear is that, if currencies are allowed to appreciate too much, then growth of the region could stumble. Also, most of the trades in the world are quoted in US$, so stability of the regional currencies with respect to the US$ leads to less business uncertainties and currency risks.

While there are advantages to keep the regional currencies closely tied to the US$, there are also increasingly large risks. While most countries have been able to manage the liquidity injection into the domestic financial system through buying up US$ to keep the local currency closely tied to the US$, it may become much more difficult in the future as economic growth in the region picks up and inflation begins to rise. In recent years, inflation has not been a real concern for most countries, in fact the concern was more on deflation. However, this is likely to change soon. Certainly in Thailand, with the economy growing by more than 6 percent last year and a similar level is expected for this year, inflation is almost sure to increase. It may then become much more difficult for the central bank to continue to buy up foreign reserves without creating too much liquidity in the system. When this is the case, and if Thailand continues to run a sizeable current account surplus, then the exchange rate will have to appreciate. Speculative forces could then make the situation dangerously volatile.

Another downside is that the region is simply promoting undisciplined spending by the US. The outcome is that the supply of US$ is flooding into the world financial system at an alarming rate. Given that the US$ is simply paper with no fundamental anchor, a huge increase in supply without a sufficient drop in value is unnatural. As long as East Asian economies support the value of the US$ by buying up excess US$, the situation can go on but the imbalances keep building. At some point, when the absorption capacity of East Asian central banks is reduced, for example by inflationary pressures, then the large imbalances that have been allowed to build up could bring huge instabilities to the world financial system and create major crises. Therefore, it is very important not to let the imbalances become too large.

What should be done? Clearly, simply demanding that some economy (particularly China) or group of economies adopt more flexible and market based exchange rates is not really addressing the fundamental problem with the current global financial system. One might turn around and put the burden of adjustment on the economy that has been pumping out more and more paper (the US), as getting rid of over-expenditure in the US will certainly be reflected in less surpluses in East Asia.

The problem is that the imbalances inherent in the current situation is already very large, as witnessed by the rapid accumulation of reserves in Japan and China. Because the current global financial system has no clear rules for adjustments, imbalances have therefore been allowed to build up. With current imbalances, unleashing the full force of the currency markets in the hope of bringing about a smooth transition to a new equilibrium is just wishful thinking. Given the inherently volatile nature of currency markets, and the existing imbalances, unleashing the full force of the currency markets is most likely to bring about chaos and economic crises.

Economies in East Asia are also competitive with each other, so any sustainable currency movements will require coordinated efforts. It is now quite essential for East Asian economies to discuss and implement concrete exchange rate coordination mechanisms in order to bring about a smooth adjustment to the current imbalances in the global financial system as a group. Going on in a business as usual fashion is very dangerous. Given that most of the world’s reserves are controlled by East Asian economies, it should be East Asia that makes pronouncements about how the world’s financial system should be evolving. Decisions on how these huge financial resources are managed have the potential to stabilize or greatly destabilize the global financial system. It is therefore imperative that a serious dialogue be initiated within the region. Finding appropriate adjustments to the current imbalances should be the next
major task of the ASEAN+3 group. This should be a major agenda item for the ASEAN+3 process.

In the longer-run, of course, there is a need to seriously think about real reforms of the international financial architecture. On this, East Asian economies must also have a great deal of input, given the amount of resources under their control. The role of the US$ will need to be re-examined, together with the significant reliance by East Asian economies on the US market as an engine of growth, as this imposes important constraints on exchange rate adjustments.

5. Toward Greater Relative Stability of Regional Currencies

As the region integrates more and more economically, greater financial integration becomes more and more important to facilitate further integration of trade and investment. As countries in the region use varying exchange rate regimes, from fixed to the US$ such as China, Hong Kong and Malaysia, to managed floats such as Thailand, South Korea and Singapore, to Yen based for Japan, volatilities in major currencies make economic transactions among countries within the region more costly. The cost will rise as the integration becomes closer. Therefore, stabilization of exchange rates of countries in region inevitably becomes a long-term goal in line with the goal of substantial economic integration of the region.

There have been a number of studies and proposals for an exchange rate arrangement for East Asia, such as the common basket peg of Williamson (1999), the yen block proposal (Kwan 2001), an East Asian Currency Index (IIMA 1999) and explorations and analyses concerning a monetary union for East Asia. The launch of the Euro in 1999 also focuses attention on whether East Asian economies can follow in the footsteps of EU economies and eventually adopt a common currency.

Regional economic integration in Europe has helped EU members achieve a number of “pluses” such as the followings. First, market liberalization and the adoption of a common regulatory framework together with less transaction cost due to currency union has broadened the scope of trade and financial flows resulting in economies of scale as well as higher efficiency. Second, the currency union has acted as a powerful catalyst for productive structural changes in the EU, particularly its financial markets. The Euro has become an attractive alternative to the U.S. dollar for international bond issuance, especially in the corporate sector. Equity markets also evolve rapidly. Third, in complying with the Euro guidelines, member states have increasingly put into place a comprehensive set of procedures for policy co-ordination. There was a remarkable convergence of views on the need to follow prudent macroeconomic policies and implement structural reforms in the markets for goods, labor, and financial products. Fourth, elimination of exchange rate variability reduces the risks, promotes greater international trade while enhancing price stability. Meanwhile, the “minus”es of European integration seem sparse. The only obligated common policies are monetary and exchange rate, while budgetary and structural policies largely remain under the national sovereignty of member countries subject to limits on fiscal deficits.

The similarities and differences between East Asia and Europe can be examined further. Each member country of both regions is not endowed with well-diversified natural resources. They thus have a strong common interest in opening up international trade and finance. Both regions have been hard hit in the nineties by severe economic, currency, and banking crises. They share the same ambition to better control the forces of economic and financial globalization, in order to create a stability-oriented economic and financial system that promotes high and sustainable growth while improving welfare. Both regions have complex models of society, which put a high price on the need to control the forces of globalization. They seek ways and means to preserve the positive features of complex economic and social models, while retaining the capacity to change in the midst of rapidly evolving circumstances.

However, East Asia and Europe are very different in several respects. Economic diversity is far more pronounced in East Asia, ranging from countries with highly modern economies to others that are still poor and with traditional or rural economic structures. In contrast, the European Union is a much more homogenous economic grouping. According to World Bank data, in 1999 per capita GNP of the richest member (Luxembourg, US$ 38,247) was 2.62 times higher than the poorest member (Greece, US$ 14,595) of the EU. In Asia, the difference amounted to 21.0 times between the richest (Singapore, US$ 27,024) and the poorest (Cambodia, US$ 1,286). Similarly, East Asian countries differed from each other to a larger extent than EU countries regarding trade openness or the proportion of foreign trade in GDP and they are also more restrictive than European countries with respect to capital controls.

Apart from these differences, the major difference has to do with the historical experiences of the two regions. In Europe, a major concern in the early days of European integration was to avoid conflicts between sovereign nations that led to the devastations of the World Wars. It was therefore possible to start with an initiative such as the Shuman Plan that established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 where the roles of the six national states that formed the ECSC for these sectors were completely submerged by a supranational body.

In East Asia, the sovereignty of each nation state in important policy matters is still jealously guarded, and also not considered to be something that would bring about great harm to the region. Therefore, the move
In this case three things will need to be done. For example, the Yen may need to appreciate by 10 percent. Necessary, the band may have to be adjusted, for global financial system from getting out of control. If need to change in order to prevent the imbalances in the same narrow band. The relative value of the Yen and the Yuan within the some fairly narrow band. This will by definition keep the exchange rate between the US$ and Yen within

cooperate on the matter then it should be possible to keep the exchange rate between the US$ and Yen within some fairly narrow band. This will by definition keep the relative value of the Yen and the Yuan within the same narrow band.

Of course, it should be clear that the band may need to change in order to prevent the imbalances in the global financial system from getting out of control. If necessary, the band may have to be adjusted, for example the Yen may need to appreciate by 10 percent. In this case three things will need to be done simultaneously. First, the Yuan will also need to be revalued by 10 percent. Second, the new band between the US$ and Yen will be announced to appreciate by 10 percent and the two countries, Japan and China (as well as other East Asian countries that may participate in this currency stabilization mechanism) will use their joint resources to try to manage the exchange rate to be within the new band. Third, other East Asia economies should also let their currencies appreciate by about 10 percent or revalue their currencies in case they are on a fixed exchange rate regime. In fact, if the ASEAN+3 as a group has this common policy to try to stabilize the Yen/US$ rate within a band, and hence stabilize the relative exchange rates of their currencies, the amount of resources available to achieve this would be close to 1.5 trillion US$.

Another possibility is to change the basket of the currencies in the region that are under fixed exchange rate regimes. Instead of fixing to the US$, they can be changed by fixing to a basket of US$, Yen, Euro and possibly other regional currencies. This will already help to lessen the relative volatilities among the region’s currencies because the gaps between the two extremes of the fixed exchange rates, i.e., those who fix to the basket and Japan which uses the Yen, will tend to be less than the case when those on a fixed exchange rate fix to the US$ alone. For other countries, they will again manage float somewhere between the Yen and the US$ as before, and may even have the relative value of the Yuan (now determined by a basket between the US$ and the Yen) as a possible target in managing the float. To ask those currently on managed floats to go back to a fixed exchange rate system (whether to a US$ dollar fix or to a basket) is simply unrealistic and ignores one very painful lesson of why the region got into a crisis in the first place, i.e., that political constraints make it very difficult for governments to adjust the value of the fixed exchange rate when necessary, especially in the downward direction.

To support closer ties between currencies within the region, it is also possible to try to promote greater utilization of regional currencies for economic transactions within the region. This will lessen reliance of external currencies for transactions within the region. Currently, the US$ is the major international currency. In Thailand, the vast majority of exports and imports are quoted in US$. Even for trades with Japan, more than half of the trades are done through the US$.

The only other international currency in the region that could perform a much bigger role for economic transactions within the region at present is the Yen. However, if the Yen is to be used more in regional transactions, then the cost of using the Yen for this purpose has to be reduced. The problem is that in most countries in the region, there are no direct foreign exchange market between the Yen and the local currency. For example, to change Baht into Yen, the banks actually carry out a two step calculation, first Baht
is converted to US$ and then US$ into Yen. Because of this two step process, the gap between the buying and selling rates for Yen is too high, about three times the gap for the US$.

Table 1 shows the buying and selling rates for major currencies (drafts) in Bangkok and also the relative gap compared to the buying rate. It can be seen that for the US$, the gap is only 0.38 percent. The gap for the Yen is the largest among the major currencies at 1.15 percent. This is more than three times the gap for the US$. With this kind of gap, it is no wonder that the Yen is not used more for economic transactions, even for imports to Thailand from Japan.

Table 1  Buying and Selling Rates for Currencies in Bangkok

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Selling</th>
<th>Buying</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Dollar</td>
<td>39.54</td>
<td>39.39</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro</td>
<td>48.34</td>
<td>47.8575</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Pound Sterling</td>
<td>72.495</td>
<td>71.95875</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Yen</td>
<td>36.02</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore Dollar</td>
<td>23.2213</td>
<td>22.96375</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More efficient exchange markets for the Yen need to be established in the region. For this to happen the role of Japanese banks are crucial. They need to set up direct exchange markets between the Yen and various local currencies. Although, forward markets for these trades do not exist now, so that the banks may not be able to cover their positions at the beginning, but as the direct exchange markets become more active, the forward markets will develop in due course. If the direct exchange markets are never set up then the forward markets will never develop either. So if one wants to wait for the existence of forward markets to be able to hedge positions and reduce risks before developing the direct exchange market, then the direct exchange market will never happen, and the Yen will not be used any more broadly than at present. The Japanese Ministry of Finance should take up this initiative, as the Japanese banks operating in various East Asian economies may need assistance to set up such direct exchange markets.

Finally, there is also the idea of trying to reduce the use of external currencies (essentially the US$ as it is the dominant international currency) for trades among East Asian economies. This can be done through net settlements of trades using local currencies or international currencies. Here again, if local currencies are to be used for settlements, one has to remember the proviso that the currency has to be internationalized to a certain extent, so not all currencies may be equally useable for the scheme.

The net settlement mechanism will require the initiatives of governments in the region to cooperate in some payment schemes for the purpose of reducing dependence on external currencies as a settlement currency. Netting represents the process in which payments for imports and exports are netted in local currency within the country before the excess is brought to settle across border. This process certainly helps pare down the amounts that need to be paid internationally. Netting has many formats but the most well-known one is bilateral payment arrangement (BPA) that Malaysia has adopted with many of her trading partner countries. This also involves some implicit subsidies to promote trades between Malaysia and her trading partners. The Malaysian BPA has not been popularly practiced as a means to use local currencies in trade financing principally because the central bank of Malaysia limits the number of commercial banks which can participate in the BPA, and there are several restrictions on product origin (to promote local products) before products become eligible. Besides, with the elimination of the off-shore Ringitt market, using the Ringitt in net settlement schemes becomes infeasible.

Another method which has been suggested is the so-called pure clearinghouse (PCH). This is an intervention-free netting process through central agencies which offer no credit guarantee and bear no credit risks. Chart 1 shows the operations of PCH where importers and exporters, via commercial banks, settle their payments in local currencies before the net amount is settled across border in U.S. dollar. Using such net settlements through PCH on a broad scale can reduce the foreign reserves needed to back up trades. Also, as the region’s financial system becomes stronger over time, and regional currencies play bigger international roles, the net settlements can be done using local currencies. This will help to gradually reduce reliance on external currencies, and greater and greater reliance on regional currencies is a necessary step along the path toward sometime in the future when East Asia as a whole may be ready to adopt a common currency along the EU model.

ENDNOTES

1 Sussangkarn and Vichyanond (2004).
2 Of Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia Ltd.
3 Most of these organizations, though not all, are independent of governments.
4 An example of research related to surveillance done by the EADN is the project on “Indicators and Analyses of Vulnerabilities to Economic Crises” in which researchers from six countries in the region develop indicators that could forewarn of a crisis or focus on particular issues of vulnerabilities for a country that they regard as important. See TDRI (2003).
5 The EADN is currently coordinated by Dr. Chalongphob Sussangkarn with the Secretariat located at the Thailand Development Research Institute.
Chart 1 Pure Clearinghouse (PCH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importers</td>
<td>Importers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baht</td>
<td>ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Banks</td>
<td>Commercial Banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baht</td>
<td>ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai PCH</td>
<td>Malaysian PCH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 For some possible roles of such an organization see, for example, Shinohara (1999a) and (1999b), and Sussangkarn (2000).

7 The ASEAN Secretariat itself will have its hands full to support further integration of ASEAN member countries to eventually become an integrated economic community.

8 For examples of necessary infrastructure development to support a regional bond market see, for example, Rhee (2000).

9 See Kawai and Takagi (2000) and Fabella (2002) for a review and analyses.


11 See for example Vichyanond and Sussangkarn (2003).

REFERENCES


East Asia: Perspectives Based on the Thai Experience. Report for the project on Toward a Regional Financial Architecture for East Asia, coordinated by the ASEAN Secretariat, June.

Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). 2003. EADN Regional Project on Indicators and Analyses of Vulnerabilities to Economic Crises. Bangkok: TDRI.
